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Abstract
eXpert-BSMis arealtimeforward-reasoningexpertsys-
tem that analyzes Sun Solaris audit trails. Based on many
years of intrusion detectionresearch, eXpert-BSM’sknowl-
edgebasedetectsawiderangeofspeciﬁcandgeneralforms
of misuse, provides detailed reports and recommendations
to the system operator, and has a low false-alarm rate.
Host-based intrusion detection offers the ability to detect
misuseandsubversionthroughthedirect monitoringofpro-
cesses inside the host, providing an important complement
to network-based surveillance. Suites of eXpert-BSMs may
be deployed throughout a network, and their alarms man-
aged, correlated, and acted on by remote or local subscrib-
ing security services, thus helping to address issues of de-
centralized management. Inside the host, eXpert-BSM is
intended to operate as a true security daemon for host sys-
tems, consuming few CPU cycles and very little memory
and secondary storage. eXpert-BSM has been available
for downloadon theInternetsince April 2000,andhas been
successfully deployed in several production environments.
1. Introduction
When researchon intrusiondetectionwas initiated in the
early 1980s, the problemwas oftenreferredto as automated
audit-trail analysis. In theory, auditing is an important se-
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curity service that both establishes accountability for users
and aids in damage assessment once an abuse is discovered.
Unfortunately, in practice the volumes of data that tend to
be produced by audit services are such that any security vi-
olation recorded within the audit trail is often secure from
discovery as well. The increasing speed and complexity of
moderncomputingenvironmentshas increasedthe volumes
of audit data that can be produced.
The Solaris Basic Security Module (BSM) [21] is one
example of an auditing facility that can provide detailed
records about system events. However, for system opera-
tors lacking intelligent analysis tools, there are two domi-
nant strategies that emerge in using the audit facility:
1. Turnon auditingfor all ormost eventtypes, and have a
careful scheme in place for copying the large amounts
of audit data to secondary storage for its potential use
later in forensic analysis.
2. Do not perform auditing at all.
Neither approachutilizes the full potential of auditing facil-
ities as an important contributor to a system’s operational
security.
The EMERALD (EventMonitoringEnablingResponses
to Anomalous Live Disturbances) environment is a dis-
tributed scalable tool suite for tracking malicious activity
through and across large networks [17]. EMERALD in-
troduces a highly distributed, building-block approach to
network surveillance, attack isolation, and automated re-
sponse. A central concept of EMERALD is its distributed,
lightweightmonitors, diversewith respect bothto the moni-
toredeventstreams and to analysis techniques. eXpert-BSM
represents one example of an EMERALD monitor that can
stand alone as an important host protection service, and can
also be easily conﬁgured to ﬁt into a distributed framework
of surveillance, correlation, and response.
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works must be obtained from the IEEE.eXpert-BSMis a securityserviceforisolatingmisuseand
other security-relevantwarning indicators from the Sun So-
laris audit facility. Initial development of eXpert-BSM be-
gan in 1998 and has continued to present. This paper is
the ﬁrst publication describing the design and features of
eXpert-BSM and how it ﬁlls a vital function in security cov-
erage not provided by network intrusion detection services.
Section 2 discusses the complementary nature of host au-
dit trail analysis and network trafﬁc monitoring. Section 3
summarizes the eXpert-BSM attack coverage. Section 4
presents the eXpert-BSM capabilities and unique features
while Section 5 discusses deployment experiences and per-
formance characteristics. Section 6 discusses related work
in the area of host-based security analysis.
2. Audit data vs network trafﬁc
An intrusion detection system (IDS) analyzes an event
stream in an attempt to categorize the events as normal or
intrusive. The ﬁrst IDSs proposed and developed in the
early 1980s were host based, analyzing the audit trails of
mainframe computers in search of anomalies and signs of
malicious activity. When later applied to networked en-
vironments, the dominant architecture was centralized col-
lection and analysis of raw audit data from multiple hosts.
The ﬁrst network-based IDS, using data “sniffed” from a
broadcast Ethernet network, was NSM from UC Davis [8].
The network-based trend that followed has been so strong
in commercialand free IDSs that many people equate intru-
sion detection with network trafﬁc analysis.
In this paper, we somewhat narrowly use the term host-
based to refer to a monitor that analyzes audit data from
the operating system kernel. In referring to host-based in-
trusion detection, others have included any form of analysis
that is focused on the protection of a single host. For ex-
ample, some IDS developers have proposed placing a net-
work event collector and analyzer locally on every host, ob-
serving trafﬁc involving only that host. That would not ﬁt
into the deﬁnition of host-based analysis as used in this pa-
per. Accordingly, network-based analyses are deﬁned here
to involve the analysis of network trafﬁc data, wherever the
monitor is located.
Major functional separation between host versus net-
work-based analyses arises from the content of the data
streams being analyzed. Audit-based analyses provide an
exceptional degree of insight into the internal operations
of processes executing within the host. From the audit-
trail vantage point, one can examine all access control deci-
sions occurring between the kernel and user processes, pro-
ﬁle normality in process activity, and compare user actions
against their expected roles within the system.
Surveillance through network trafﬁc analysis allows a
system to view the network communications across multi-
ple hosts. In broadcast networks, a single sensor can pro-
vide analysis coverage over an entire local area network
(LAN). Both host- and network-based surveillance are im-
portantandcomplementary. Eachhasitsplaceinthearsenal
of INFOSEC devices being made available to supplement
the need for computer and network security. However, each
approach has its respective weaknesses.
2.1. Network-based IDS limitations
A fundamental limitation to network analysis is that not
all forms of misuse will necessarily generate network traf-
ﬁc. Further, not all misuse activity that results in network
trafﬁc will provide sufﬁcient information to isolate the mis-
use. Examples of such information include the true full lo-
cal pathname of a ﬁle retrieved through HTTP, or the user
ID under which a particular service daemon executes. This
is also a problem with buffer overﬂows and other well-
known malicious attacks that are performed from the con-
sole or over an encrypted channel.
Application-layer encryption of network trafﬁc is be-
coming more common and user transparent thanks to tech-
nology such as SSL-enabled Web browsers and Secure
Shell (ssh). The same is true for lower-layer encryption
through virtual private networks, some of which are based
on the IPSEC standard. While this is a positive step for-
wardincommunicationsintegrityandthepreventionofdata
theft,it makesnetwork-basedintrusiondetectionmoredifﬁ-
cult as potentiallymalicious instructionsare also encrypted.
Another problem with network intrusion detection in-
volvestheevolutionofcommonnetworktopologies,specif-
ically, the growing popularity of non-broadcast networks.
Inserting a network sniffer in the path of all LAN traf-
ﬁc is becoming more challenging. For example, switching
technologyallows improvednetworkperformancebyeffec-
tively turning a broadcast Ethernet network into a unicast
network, hampering snifﬁng opportunities. Also, if there
are multiple possible routes between two communicating
hosts, some packets could be routed aroundthe sniffer loca-
tion.
When interceptingand analyzingthe communicationbe-
tween two hosts, it is of paramount importance for correct
analysis that the trafﬁc is interpretedequally by the IDS and
the receiver. If not, the IDS could be tricked into interpret-
ing trafﬁc as benign while the receiver, making a different
interpretation, becomes the victim of an attack. With re-
spect to IP stacks, there are many subtle differences among
operating systems that could be used by an attacker to send
instructions that appear benign to the IDS, but have ma-
lign effects on the victim host [19]. The same holds for
application-level interpretation. For instance, Web servers
forthe Windows platformtendto accept the backslash char-
acter as a valid path separator in addition to the forward
2slash, while servers on Unix platforms do not.
Network trafﬁc analysis is also challenged with the need
to provide transaction and session reconstruction, requiring
great efﬁciency in managing state. In many cases, a sin-
gle packet is not sufﬁcient to correctly identify intrusive be-
havior. For advanced analysis, the IDS must reconstruct
transactions and sessions based on the observed data and
therefore keep potentially large amounts of state informa-
tion for arbitrarily long periods of time. Merely combining
the requests and replies across many parallel sessions into
transactions can be a complex task for the IDS.
Finally, there is the issue of scalability of a network IDS
to large trafﬁc volumes. For line speeds where relatively
simple routing decisions have to be made in ﬁrmware to be
sufﬁciently fast, the more complicated analysis required by
an IDS implemented in software has little chance to keep
up.
2.2. Host-based IDS limitations
Host-based intrusion detection can avoid most, if not all,
of the problems listed above. Thus, it is an important com-
plement to the threat coverage of network-based monitor-
ing. However, host-based monitors also have a set of gen-
eral problems associated with them.
As with network trafﬁc analysis, host-based analysis is
limited by the available content in the event stream. For
example, a host-based monitor can fail to observe network-
related activity. This illustrates the complementary nature
that host analysis shares with network trafﬁc analysis tools.
Unfortunately,the use of network-based vulnerability scan-
ners has become a prominent practice in security evalua-
tion procedures, and an evaluator pointing a network scan-
ner against a host equipped with a host-based IDS is often
disappointed when the IDS does not react to all elements of
the scan. Very severe host attacks readily detectable with
host-based analysis are similarly often not recognizable by
network IDSs.
Another potential issue with a host-based IDS is its vul-
nerability to attack once a system has been compromised.
When an attacker has taken over the omnipotent super-user
account (root, administrator), then, in the absence of auto-
matedresponse,theIDSis itselfsubjecttoattack. IftheIDS
transmits alarm informationoverthe networkto anotheren-
tity, it may be able to report super-user subversion to others
before the attacker can stop the IDS.
If a denial-of-service attack brings down the host, the
IDS will go down with it. The IDS may be able to raise an
alarm about a resource-exhaustionattack in progress, while
there could be other attacks that crash the host with only
a minimal number of network packets, before the IDS can
send out an alarm. The additional load put on the host by
the IDS monitor could also be of concern.
3. eXpert-BSM knowledge base
Among the ﬁrst steps toward developing an effective
and maintainable misuse detection service is to select a
reasoning strategy and knowledge representation structure
that is well suited and efﬁcient for this problem domain.
In [10], we argue why forward-chaining rule-based sys-
tems are highly useful for computer and network intrusion
detection. The core of eXpert-BSM consists of an infer-
ence engine and knowledge base built with the Production-
Based ExpertSystem Toolset (P-BEST),a highlyoptimized
forward-chaining rule-based system builder for real-time
event analysis.
In the ﬁeld of expert system analysis, forward-chaining
strategies dominate applications that provide prognosis,
monitoring,andsystem control. Generally,forward-reason-
ing systems excel in expressing logical inferences across
multiple events in search of speciﬁc event sequences or
activity that crosses predeﬁned thresholds of normalcy.
eXpert-BSM’s P-BEST models can comprehend intrusive
behavior that may involve complex/multiple event order-
ings with elaborate pre- or post-conditions. This allows for
a concise rule base, while still being able to recognize wide
variation in intrusive activity.
In contrast, a variety of signature-based intrusion detec-
tion techniquesemploy stateless reasoningto isolate single-
step malicious activity, such as rudimentary pattern match-
ing. For very high-volume event analysis, stateless pred-
icate reasoning can be quite effective for simple single-
packet exploit detection. However, limited expressibility in
misuse deﬁnitions can lead to inﬂated rule bases to cover
all variations of a known phenomena. Rudimentary pattern
matching also fails to cover multi-event scenarios.
From 1996to present, P-BEST has beenemployedin the
development of nine independent intrusion-detection en-
gines under the EMERALD framework of distributed sen-
sors managed under a correlation hierarchy. P-BEST has
shown itself to be an effective real-time transaction pro-
cessing system, with a pre-compilation library that allows
its inference engines and knowledge bases to be easily inte-
grated into large programframeworks. Its languageis small
and easily extendible, as calls to arbitrary C functions are
possible anywhere in the rule structure. Since its inception
on Unix, P-BEST has undergone many optimizations (Sec-
tion 5.3).
The P-BEST toolset consists of a rule translator and a
library of run-time routines. When using P-BEST, rules
and facts are written in the P-BEST production rule spec-
iﬁcation language. The misuse detection P-BEST compiler,
pbcc, is then used to translate the P-BEST knowledge spec-
iﬁcation into a callable expert system library. A full dis-
cussion of the P-BEST language deﬁnition with examples
is provided in [10].
33.1. eXpert-BSM attack coverage
The eXpert-BSM knowledge base consists of 123 P-
BEST rules, which allow eXpert-BSM to recognize 46 gen-
eral forms of misuse or warning indicators of abuse. Initial
development of this rule base began in 1998 and has con-
tinued to present. Based on experimental evaluations (see
Section 5.2) and other input, eXpert-BSM’s knowledgebase
has been reﬁned and extended into an effective suite of in-
trusion models for identifying, where possible, the broadest
forms of activity that indicate abusive or intrusive activity
on Unix hosts.
eXpert-BSM excels at detecting when an adversary at-
tempts to violate security on the host, regardless of whether
it is an external agent or an insider operating from the con-
sole. While attack space coverageis not claimed to be com-
plete, signiﬁcant effort and experience has been invested in
this knowledge base over several years. The majority of
the intrusion models attempt to recognize the most general
form of misuse by detecting state transitions that represent
the underlying compromise of intrusions and other known
misuse activity. With respect to attack coverage, these in-
trusion models are categorized under the following broad
areas of host misuse:
Data Theft — involves attempts by non-administrative
users to perform read operations on ﬁles or devices
in a manner considered inconsistent with the system
security policy. This includes attempts to access ﬁles
stored in nonpublicdirectories that are owned by other
users, ortoreferenceﬁles inviolationofeXpert-BSM’s
surveillance policy (Section 3.2). The category in-
cludes attempts to access root core ﬁle contents, a
well-known method to gain access to encrypted or
even cleartext password content. The category also in-
cludes openingnetwork interface devices in promiscu-
ous mode, indicating attempts by non-administrative
users to sniff trafﬁc from the network.
System/User Data Manipulation — attempts by non-
administrative users to modify system or user data,
where modify broadly means attempts to alter, create,
overwrite, append, remove, or change content or the
attributes of ﬁle system objects. Coverage in this cate-
gory includes attempts to modify system ﬁles within
which security-relevant conﬁguration parameters are
stored. This conﬁgurablelist of ﬁles typically includes
ﬁles in /etc. The category also includes attempts by
anonymous FTP users to modify ﬁle system content
outside a predeﬁned upload directory, should one ex-
ist. Intrusion models that detect attempts to modify
user environment ﬁles (e.g., .csrhc, .login, or .rhosts)
or modify ﬁles in violation of eXpert-BSM’s surveil-
lance policy (Section 3.2) are also included in this cat-
egory. Lastly, the category provides comprehensive
coverage over attempts to modify system executable
binaries andscripts stored in publiclysharedbinarydi-
rectories.
PrivilegeSubversion—providesbroadandeffectivecov-
erageofillegalattemptsto subvertrootorotheradmin-
istrator authority, either through the illegal changing
of one’s operatingauthority, subvertingthe functionof
a privileged (setuid) application, or by causing a set-
uid process to execute an application that is not owned
by the setuid program owner or the system. Intrusion
models in this category are capable of detecting the
three variations of buffer overﬂow attacks [14, 2] that
continue to plague Unix setuid applications and inetd
services: execargumentbufferoverﬂows,environment
variable overﬂows, and data-segment overﬂows. The
generalityof eXpert-BSM’s bufferoverﬂowmodel was
demonstrated when a new such exploit was published
for Solaris 8 [5]. Without being updated with speciﬁc
knowledgeabout the new attack, eXpert-BSM detected
and correctly identiﬁed this event as privilege subver-
sion through a buffer overﬂow. Overall, the BSM au-
dit trail provides far superior event content than net-
work trafﬁc from which to identify process subversion
on hosts. Inetd service subversion (such as the well-
known sadmind(1) attack on Solaris [3]) is an exam-
ple of a data segment buffer overﬂow, while exec ar-
gument and environment variable overﬂows have been
exploited in perhaps more than a dozen setuid applica-
tions on Solaris alone (e.g., eject, fdformat, ffbconﬁg,
passwd, ping, rdist, rlogin, ufsrestore, and xlock).
Account Probing and Guessing — identiﬁes repeated at-
tempts to enter a system via authentication services
suchas rloginorFTP,orattemptsto gainrootauthority
by non-administrativeusers or from external clients.
Suspicious Network Activity — recognizes various at-
tempts to probe or scan the host, or misuse the host’s
FTP services to distribute content to other external
sites (i.e., FTP warez hosting). While BSM audit trails
provide minimal insight into raw network trafﬁc activ-
ity, they do allow the monitor to recognize successful
connections to TCP-based services, and more impor-
tantly provide detailed insight into the internal opera-
tions of the network server process as it is being used
(or potentially misused). eXpert-BSM also provides a
TCP port scan detection capability on TCP ports that
have enabled services on the host.
Asset Distress — identiﬁes operational activity that in-
dicates a current or impending failure or signiﬁcant
degradation of a system asset. The majority of these
4problems are very difﬁcult, if not impossible, to di-
agnose via network trafﬁc analysis. This category in-
cludes ﬁlesystem or process table exhaustion, and also
core-dump events by root-owned services. In addi-
tion, this category includes detection of malicious ser-
vice denials, both through remote agents attempting
to exhaust process tables via inetd services, and by a
Solaris-speciﬁc self echo ﬂooding attack by local host
processes.
User-speciﬁable Surveillance — allows the eXpert-BSM
operator to create site-speciﬁc policies on activity that
should trigger an immediate alarm. This category in-
cludes the ability to recognize operator-deﬁned com-
mandargumentsconsideredsuspiciousforthatsiteand
worthy of administrative review. In addition, the op-
erator can specify network ports that should not be
accessed by external clients. Examples may include
TCP ports 53 (DNS zone transfer), 143 (imapd), or
514(syslogd). This categoryalso includes the addition
of a powerful feature for specifying a site surveillance
policy to monitor user accesses to data and executable
ﬁles (discussed in Section 3.2).
Other Security-relevant Events — provides other gen-
eral security-relevant activity reports worthy of review
by security administrators. This includes signiﬁcant
backward movement of the system clock beyond what
is normally performed by clock synchronization pro-
tocols. This backward time movement is a possible
indicator of an attacker attempting to manipulate ﬁle
or log state to reduce the risk of detection. This cate-
gory recognizes setuid enabling by non-administrative
users, and suspicious symbolic link creation in pub-
licly writable directories. Process execution by re-
served accounts that are not intended to run applica-
tions (e.g., bin, sys) are also recognized. Finally, this
category recognizes attempts to alter the underlying
audit conﬁguration, potentially in an effort to ﬂood or
starve eXpert-BSM.
3.2. File surveillance policy speciﬁcation
eXpert-BSM provides a facility for specifying a surveil-
lance policy over ﬁle reads, writes, and executions. Under
this policy, the eXpert-BSM operator may specify groups of
users, ﬁles, and directories, and then use these groups to
specify surveillance policies regarding ﬁle accesses. This
allows the operator to easily establish rules for generating
immediate notiﬁcation when users step outside their desig-
nated roles on the system.
Forexample,consideraconsultantwhois grantedaccess
to parts of a ﬁle server that also contains company sensitive
data to which the consultant should not have access. The
operatorwould, as a ﬁrst line of defense, set access controls
on ﬁles and directories to prevent the consultant’s access to
these sensitive ﬁle system areas. However, over time users
who work in these areas may fail to continually manage the
proper settings on these ﬁles and directories, or may create
new sensitive ﬁles that by default allow the consultant ac-
cess. The surveillance policy allows the operator to easily
detect whenever the consultant accesses, or even attempts
to access, ﬁles or directories in the sensitive areas of the ﬁle
system.
There are three distinct components to be speciﬁed
within an eXpert-BSM access policy speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst
component, the UserGroups section, allows the operator to
specify groups of users, which are then referenced in the
access policy. The names speciﬁed under the user groups
should be present as valid login names deﬁned within the
password ﬁle, and user names can appear in multiple lists.
The second section, FileGroups, allows the operator to
specify a set of ﬁles and directories that may be referenced
together as a group while enumerating the access policy.
Files speciﬁed in the ﬁle groups should be fully qualiﬁed
pathnames. The operator can also specify directories, as
shown in the example surveillance policy speciﬁcation in
Figure 1. Files and directories can appear in multiple lists.
The thirdsection is Policy, within whichthe operatorcan
specify illegal read, write, and execute accesses between
users and ﬁles. The policy section essentially deﬁnes ac-
cess mode relations among user groups and ﬁle groups. For
each user group entered in the policy, three possible rela-
tions can be speciﬁed: nread, nwrite, and nexec. The nread
mode indicates that users in the associated list are not al-
lowed to read ﬁles matching the ﬁle lists speciﬁed in the
bracket clause. Illegal ﬁle writes and executions are speci-
ﬁed similarly. Figure 1 presents an example of an eXpert-
BSM access policy speciﬁcation.
In Figure 1, there exists a small groupof regularstaff de-
ﬁned as user1 and user2. There is a management staff, with
one manager admin and an accounting group consisting of
user acct. Four ﬁle groups are deﬁned. The ﬁrst ﬁle group
is the programs group, where programs are deﬁned as be-
ing located in /bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, and /usr/local/
ftp/bin. An administrative tools group consists of ﬁles in
/etc/bin, /etc/sbin, /usr/sbin, and /sbin. A directory contain-
ing company secrets is named /secret. A payroll ﬁle group
consists of a ﬁle called /accounting/DBMS/payroll.db.
InFigure1,regularstaffarenotallowedtoreadcompany
secrets or payroll data, as speciﬁed by the associated nread
function. Regular staff may not write to ﬁles in the com-
pany secrets, programs, payroll, or admin tools, and regular
staff may not execute admin tools. If eXpert-BSM observes
user activity that contradicts this policy, an alert is raised.
Members of the management staff are not allowed to mod-
ify ﬁles in the program or admin tools ﬁle groups, but have
5UserGroups { RegStaff (user1 user2)
Management (admin)
Accounting (acct)
}
FileGroups { Programs ( /bin /usr/bin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/ftp/bin )
Admtools ( /etc/bin /etc/sbin /usr/sbin /sbin )
CompanySecrets ( /secret )
Payroll ( /accounting/DBMS/payroll.db )
}
Policy { RegStaff (
nread[CompanySecrets Payroll]
nwrite[CompanySecrets Programs Payroll Admtools]
nexec[Admtools] )
Management(
nread[]
nwrite[Programs Admtools]
nexec[] )
Accounting (
nwrite[Programs Admtools]
nread[CompanySecrets]
nexec[Admtools] )
}
Figure 1. Example surveillance policy.
unrestricted read and execute access over the entire system.
Members of the accounting staff are not allowed to mod-
ify ﬁles in the program or admin ﬁle groups, read company
secret ﬁles, or execute admin tools.
4. eXpert-BSM architecture and features
The preceding section discusses the threat coverage pro-
vided by the eXpert-BSM knowledge base. This section
provides an overview of the features and capabilities of
the eXpert-BSM distribution package, and its management
when deployed on multiple hosts in a network.
4.1. Preprocessing the Solaris BSM event stream
eXpert-BSM runs on Solaris 2.6, 7, and 8, in 32-bit and
64-bit operating modes. These versions of Solaris have an
auditing mechanism known as SunSHIELD Basic Security
Module[21], or BSM for short. BSM has its roots in the C2
compatibility package for SunOS 4.x, developed to comply
with the TCSEC [22] (Orange Book) requirements.
Before analyzing audit records, eXpert-BSM’s event pre-
processing service, ebsmgen, ﬁrst transforms the content of
each audit record into an internal message structure. These
messages include two importantsyntheticﬁelds, called syn-
thetic parentCmd and synthetic parentIP. Although audit
records provide detailed information regarding each sys-
tem call, they do not identify the command (process im-
age name) under which the system call was invoked. The
synthetic parentCmd ﬁeld tracks this important attribute by
observingexec calls. Second,althoughSolarisauditrecords
arestructuredtoincludeinformationregardingsourceIPin-
formation for transactions not performed from the console,
this information is unreliable across audit event types and
OS versions. By tracking the source IP information and al-
ways reporting it in synthetic parentIP, ebsmgen provides
consistently correct IP information for all audit records.
Each message is passed on from the preprocessor to the
event handlinginterface of the expert system, where it is as-
serted as a fact according to a fact type deﬁnition known as
a ptype in P-BEST [10]. Figure 2 shows the ptypedeﬁnition
for audit records, as used in eXpert-BSM. Each ﬁeld in the
ptype corresponds to audit token data ﬁelds, except for the
two synthetic tokens explained above.
Developingtools for analysis of BSM data is not without
difﬁculty. The only tool providedwith Solaris for audit data
interpretation is praudit, which prints audit data in a sim-
ple text form. Although Solaris has some library routines
for producing binary audit records, there are no routines
available for consumers of BSM data. There is no formal
grammarspeciﬁed for BSM to help developersof consumer
tools, and an effort to specify such a grammar for the BSM
of Solaris 2.6 encounteredsome difﬁculties [6]. In Solaris 7
and 8, several new and initially undocumented audit token
types were introduced. These are related to the support of
64-bit mode and other new features such as IPv6.
The syntax of audit records and audit tokens is relatively
well speciﬁed in the documentation, but the semantics of
the content is not. This is especially true for audit records
6ptype[bsm_event
human_time: string, ‘Header timestamp as a string.
header_event_type: int, ‘Header event numerical ID
header_time: int, ‘Header time as a numeric value.
header_command: string, ‘Header event ID as a string (event name)
header_size: int, ‘Header byte count
msequenceNumber: int, ‘Sequence token number
path_List: string, ‘Paths from one or several path tokens
subject_auid: int, ‘Subject audit ID
subject_euid: int, ‘Subject effective user ID
subject_ruid: int, ‘Subject real user ID
subject_pid: int, ‘Subject process ID
subject_sid: int, ‘Subject audit session ID
subject_machine_ID: string, ‘Subject machine ID
in_addr_address: string, ‘In_addr Internet address
in_addr_hostname: string, ‘In_addr Internet hostname
attr_uidList: int, ‘Attribute owner UID
val_List: int, ‘Argument value
return_return_value: int, ‘Return process value
return_error_number: int, ‘Return process error
textList: string, ‘Text strings from one or several text tokens
exec_args: string, ‘Exec arguments
exec_env_txt: string, ‘Exec environment
sock1_sock_type: int, ‘Socket type
sock1_remote_port: int, ‘Socket remote port
sock1_remote_iaddr: string, ‘Socket remote IP address
sock1_local_port: int, ‘Socket local port
sock1_local_iaddr: string, ‘Socket local IP address
sock2_sock_type: int, ‘Socket type for second socket token
sock2_remote_port: int, ‘Socket remote port for second socket token
synthetic_parentCmd: string, ‘Synthetic parent command
synthetic_parentIP: string ‘Synthetic parent IP address
]
Figure 2. The P-BEST ptype for BSM events.
generated by applications outside the kernel, such as the lo-
gin program. For developers of BSM audit trail analysis
tools, such as the system described in this paper, this ne-
cessitates empirical studies of large amounts of audit data
to understand the semantics of the BSM data stream. Un-
documented changes between different versions of Solaris
contribute to the difﬁculty of this task.
4.2. Modes of operation
eXpert-BSM requires no reactive probing of the system
state, resulting in an IDS that produces identical results in
batch and real-time modes. Batch-mode processing allows
eXpert-BSM operators to process previously archived audit
ﬁles, typicallycreatedbyauditd. Inreal-timemode,eXpert-
BSM is able to analyze audit records as they are produced
by the kernel. The eXpert-BSM inference engine is pack-
aged together with three additional modules that cooperate
to relay BSM recordsdirectly fromthe kernelto the eXpert-
BSM inference engine via interprocess communication, as
illustrated in Figure 3. In its real-time operating mode, the
eXpert-BSM package employs the following modules:
ebsmsetpolicy — (real-time mode) is a small setuid to root
application that conﬁgures the desired audit policy for
the kernel, then terminates immediately.
ebsmprobe — (real-time mode) establishes process-to-
processcommunicationbetweentheSolaris kerneland
ebsmgen. ebsmprobe runs setuid to root in order to
read the audit records from the kernel.
ebsmgen— (batchandreal-timemodes)acceptsandtrans-
lates Solaris BSM audit recordsinto EMERALD event
messages as discussed in Section 4.1. An intermediate
process is also used to manage buffers efﬁciently.
eXpert-BSM — (batchand real-time modes) is the EMER-
ALD P-BEST-based forward-chaining expert system
knowledge base and inference engine. It accepts event
messages from ebsmgen and produces intrusion detec-
tion reports.
4.3. Alert message format
Within the EMERALD project, a format for alert mes-
sageshasbeendeveloped,withbothproducerandconsumer
7ebsmprobe ebsmgen eXpert-BSM
kernel
OS
ebsmsetpolicy
raw audit data preprocessed messages alerts
Figure 3. The components and data ﬂow in the eXpert-BSM process chain (real-time mode).
processes in mind. Producers include monitors targeting
diverse event streams, using different analysis techniques,
such as the expert system used in eXpert-BSM or the prob-
abilistic model of eBayes [23]. Typical consumers are alert
management and presentation applications, correlation en-
gines, and components handling automated attack counter-
measures.
InFigure4, anexamplealertfromeXpert-BSM is shown.
It reports that user bob successfully changed ﬁle permis-
sions on a system executable ﬁle. Messages are encoded
in a host-independentbinary form suited for network trans-
portation, but printed here in text form. Response recom-
mendations are provided here both in a verbose format tar-
geted for presentation to human operators and in a format
aimed at automated response components.
4.4. Multi-host deployment
The host-based IDS concept is tightly coupled to the
surveillance needs of individual host computing assets dis-
tributed throughout a network. This concept of distributed,
lightweight sensors plays a central role in the EMERALD
architecture and, consequently, the EMERALD infrastruc-
ture provides mechanisms for component conﬁguration,
message transmission, alert subscription, and distributed
alert consolidation [13].
Currently, multi-host deployments of eXpert-BSM are
supported through an alert collection application called
efunnel, which multiplexes alert and status messages from
several EMERALD monitors into a single message stream.
Each eXpert-BSM is conﬁgurable to store its produced
alarms locally on its host if desired, and can simultane-
ously forward these alerts to other subscribing security ser-
vices located on remote systems distributed throughout the
network. For example, efunnel, or its counterpart eDBMS
for alarm storage into an SQL database, can be deployed
and conﬁgured to subscribe to alert communications from
a large suite of EMERALD monitors, including multiple
eXpert-BSMs.
An example of multi-host deployment is illustrated in
Figure 5. In this ﬁgure, EMERALD monitors are deployed
across various key assets on a network. In addition to
alarms, all EMERALD monitors (including eXpert-BSM)
Message ID 601 2001-02-03 01:23:19.761289 UTC:
alert_report_ID = 3
alert_thread_ID = 3
alert_count = 1
alert_gen_time = 2001-02-03 01:23:19.000000 UTC
alert_start = 2001-02-03 01:23:19.000000 UTC
alert_model_confidence = AL_CONFIDENCE_HIGH
incident_class = CLASS_INTEGRITY_VIOLATION
incident_signature = BAD_SYSTEM_BIN_MOD
incident_description =
Alteration to system executable
observer_type = OB_TYPE_SIGNATURE
observer_id = 102
observer_stream = OB_STREAM_BSM
observer_name = eXpert-BSM
observer_version = 1.2
observer_location = 192.168.2.20
observer_src_file = realtime
source_IParray = 192.168.1.100
source_username = bob
source_ruid = 0
source_euid = 0
source_auid = 2138
source_pid = 6597
target_IParray = 192.168.2.20
outcome_generic = SUCCESS
outcome_system_code = 0 (0x0)
command = chmod(2)
command_parent = /usr/bin/chmod
resource_targetname = /usr/bin/gunzip
resource_owner = root
resource_owner_uid = 0
recommendation =
"Kill process 6597, Session ID 6542.
Isolate and examine file [ /usr/bin/gunzip ].
Lock out user account bob until you have
determined who is responsible for this
activity. Check the configuration parameter
BSM_SYSTEM_BIN_LOCATIONS."
recommendation_directives =
"kill -pid 6542 -da 192.168.2.20
lockout -uname bob -da 192.168.2.20
fixperms -fn /usr/bin/gunzip -da 192.168.2.20
-newattr 000
checkcfg -da 192.168.2.20
-name BSM_SYSTEM_BIN_LOCATIONS"
Figure 4. An example alert message from
eXpert-BSM.
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Figure 5. An example of multi-host deployment of eXpert-BSM.
are capable of forwarding health and status messages to
their subscribers. Health and status messages can then be
used to recognize unexpected shutdown or destruction of
deployed EMERALD monitors, thus making it difﬁcult to
kill a monitor without detection by other INFOSEC ser-
vices. In Figure 5, a suite of eXpert-BSM monitors for-
ward their alerts to a host running efunnel operating on the
same LAN. In addition, a subset of the eXpert-BSM mon-
itors have a separate subscriber operating from a location
externaltothelocalnetwork. Theremotesubscriberis man-
aging an SQL database, and using eDBMS to store alert in-
formation from its selected sensors. On this remote data
center, one may operate a correlation engine to examine
the database of alert reports produced by selected monitors
across this and other LANs.
5. Operational characteristics
eXpert-BSM has been packaged and distributed over the
last fouryears to sponsors throughprivatearrangement,and
later as an evaluation release on the Internet to all who reg-
ister. Throughout its development, eXpert-BSM has been
subject to multiple third-party evaluations, batch testing,
and red-team exercises as part of its participation in the
DARPA Information Assurance Program. Experiences in
operational deployments of eXpert-BSM have also greatly
enhanced its capabilities, and has promoted attention to is-
sues of optimization for real-world requirements. This sec-
tion brieﬂy summarizes activities that have enhanced the
operational characteristics of eXpert-BSM.
5.1. Test battery
The eXpert-BSMdistributionincludes a test battery,con-
taining a data collection that can be used in batch mode to
trigger every intrusion model in the knowledge base. The
user documentation contains both a description of the test
data and a description of the expected output in terms of
eXpert-BSM reports. In addition to being a basis for regres-
sion testing during development, this data set is useful to
eXpert-BSM operators in several ways. Typically, an opera-
torwouldlike tobe assuredthat themonitorworkscorrectly
after installation. When started in test mode, eXpert-BSM
loads the conﬁguration settings that are speciﬁc for the test
battery, and starts a batch mode run that will exercise the
analysis and presentation components of eXpert-BSM. This
will show the operator all the possible types of reports that
the monitor can produce. In addition, if the operator wants
to run live attacks to make an end-to-end test in real time,
thetest batterydocumentationprovideshelpfulinstructions.
The test battery is designed to be a concentrated collec-
tion of attack data, with as little normal data as possible, to
minimize the size of the data ﬁle and the time it takes to run
through it. The purpose of the test is to validate the proper
operation of all the intrusion models in eXpert-BSM, and to
demonstrate the contents of the resulting reports. Although
producing such data is time-consuming and sometimes dif-
ﬁcult, we believe that this type of test battery is appreciated
by IDS operators. Results from a questionnaire sent to reg-
istered eXpert-BSM operators strongly support this view.
Another form of testing is to run through large amounts
9of normal data to make sure that there are no false alarms.
We continuouslyperformsuchtesting ofeXpert-BSMin our
development and production environments. The DARPA
IDS evaluation data from 1998 and 1999 is of this charac-
ter [11], with several weeks of large data sets containing a
small suite of attacks inserted for every day. The attacks
selected are intended to exploit a strategically broad range
of vulnerabilitiesthat are representativeof the major threats
being used to inﬁltrate systems today.
5.2. Experimentation, deployment, and evaluation
Over the years of its development, versions of eXpert-
BSMhave beendeployedinthird-partylaboratories,suchas
groups within the Air Force Research Laboratory and Na-
tional Security Agency, for operational evaluations and ex-
periments. In addition, these components have participated
inmultipleyearlylive red-teamexercises,mainlywithinthe
DARPA Information Assurance and Survivability suite of
research programs. These activities have provided valuable
input to the continuing development of the knowledge base
and other features of eXpert-BSM.
In April 2000, the ﬁrst release of eXpert-BSM was made
available for download on the Internet. Those who regis-
tered their contact information were granted a time-limited
evaluation license. At the time of writing, well over 200
organizations have registered.
We are currently aware of at least one military oper-
ational center and one commercial data center where the
evaluation version has been ﬁelded operationally to moni-
tor critical servers. At both centers eXpert-BSM has been in
continuous use for more than a year.
5.3. Optimization and Performance
In general, expert systems built with P-BEST are much
faster than systems using the traditional interpreting model.
This is because P-BEST code is translated to C, which is
then compiled just like any C program [10]. In addition,
P-BEST has undergone several modiﬁcations to further en-
hanceits performanceintermsofspeedandintegrationwith
other programs. The modiﬁcations include language exten-
sions that allow most C native types to be used in P-BEST,
translator directives to pass some constructs directly to the
C code, and an improved execution model for the inference
engine. We have also developed C libraries that optimize
the evaluation of complex antecedent expressions.
For any IDS analyzing a high-bandwidth event stream,
it is important to be able to discard as much irrelevant data
as possible as early in the process as possible. The eXpert-
BSM knowledge base uses only 58 of the over 250 possi-
ble types of BSM audit records (auditable event types) in
its intrusion models. In real-time mode, the Solaris au-
dit kernel module is conﬁgured to produce only those 58
types of records. For batch mode, our preprocessing com-
ponent ebsmgen performs the same selection. Our experi-
mentsshowthatforlargesets oftypicalauditdata(
￿ 1GB),
this preselection reduces the amount of data that need to
be produced and processed to on average about 10% of the
total amount that would be produced if full auditing were
enabled.
The original auditd is designed to write audit records
only to ﬁles. The eXpert-BSM package includes a com-
ponent called ebsmprobe that replaces auditd, reads audit
recordsdirectly from the kernel, and uses interprocesscom-
munication to pass the records to the preprocessing and
analysis components for direct consumption. Thus, eXpert-
BSM avoids expensive disk I/O operations for audit records
and eliminates the need to reserve large amounts of disk
space for audit ﬁles.
We recommend installing eXpert-BSM on local disk
space rather than on network-mounted volumes, for better
security and to avoid unpredictable ﬁle access delays. In-
ternally, any kind of over-the-network access such as NIS
or DNS lookup is avoided, except during the short initial-
ization phase. Because many sites use NIS for user account
information, eXpert-BSM uses its own local ﬁle for map-
ping numerical user IDs to usernames, which comprises the
information in /etc/passwd and NIS.
If the monitored host is running an extremely active pro-
cess producing very large volumes of audit records, such as
a heavily loaded DBMS, auditing can be turned off for that
process to let the IDS be more responsive in its monitor-
ing of the other processes on the host. We propose that a
separate account be created for the sole purpose of running
the heavy process, and that the account be excepted from
auditing by an entry in /etc/security/audit user.
To obtainperformancemeasurements,we havedeployed
eXpert-BSMon a Sun Enterprise450, which is used as a ﬁle
server and compute server for about 15 users. The machine
is equippedwith two UltraSparcII 400 Mhz processors, and
1 GB RAM. The additional load imposed by eXpert-BSM
was studied in an experiment where we measured the com-
pletiontimeforbuildingarelativelylargesoftwarepackage,
both in the presence and in the absence of the eXpert-BSM
monitor. We ran make for a clean distribution of openssl-
0.9.6 and measured the completion time as reported by
/usr/bin/time. A total of 10 runs were performed for each
of the two situations, and each run was followed by other
operations to eliminate the effects of ﬁle-system caches etc.
When eXpert-BSM was not running, the 10 builds took on
average 428 seconds each to complete, with a standard de-
viation of 0.8. With eXpert-BSM running in its “out-of-the-
box” conﬁguration, each build produced 94,684 audit event
records, and took on average 454 seconds to complete, with
a standard deviation of 1.1. We can conclude that the pres-
10ence of the eXpert-BSM monitor caused a 6% increase in
completion time for the task.
6. Related work
Operating system audit logs offer an interesting vantage
point to the security-relevant operations of host systems.
In [15], a design of effective auditing for security-critical
systems is explored. Some standardization efforts for han-
dling audit content have been examined [1], as have issues
of what additional network related activity is worthy of rep-
resentation in host audit trails [4]. A more recent work on
applying formality to audit log structures is [6], which in-
cludes a discussion on some of the difﬁculties in automated
BSM audit trail parsing.
There is a variety of related research efforts that explore
what one can do with audit data to automatically detect
threats to the host. An important work is MIDAS [20], as it
was one of the original applications of expert systems—in
fact using P-BEST—to the problem of monitoring user ac-
tivity logs for misuse and anomalous user activity. CMDS,
by SAIC, demonstrated another application of a forward-
chaining expert-system, CLIPS, to a variety of operating
system logs[18]. USTAT [9] offeredanotherformulationof
intrusion heuristics using state transition diagrams [16], but
by design remained a classic forward-chaining expert sys-
tem inference engine. ASAX [7] introducedthe Rule-based
Sequence Evaluation Language (RUSSEL) [12], which is
tuned speciﬁcally for the analysis of host audit trails.
7. Conclusion
Host-based intrusion detectionoffers the ability to detect
a wide variety of computer misuse through the direct anal-
ysis of process activity inside the host. Host-based analysis
offers an important complement to network trafﬁc analysis,
providingthreat detection coveragethat is simply not easily
available through the analysis of raw network trafﬁc.
eXpert-BSM is a powerful and mature service for isolat-
ingsecuritymisuse andimportantsecurity-relevantwarning
indicators. It analyzes the rich content of the Solaris BSM
audit stream in real time, providing operators with distilled
alert information and response recommendations. eXpert-
BSMhasbeenunderdevelopmentsince1998,andcontinues
to progress in its effectiveness and usability through exten-
sive testing, experimentation, and deployment experience.
eXpert-BSM is available for download at:
http://www.sdl.sri.com/emerald
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